714-737-1183 belongs to a mentally ill stalker by the name of Rebecca Vasconcellos who lives now in
hayter Ave. in Lakewood, CA after selling her condo for $212,000.00 in Long beach CA, in Nov.
Read about her below and look up her in LA superior court, long beach court house, Santa Monica court house and brevard county court house for proof of her criminal actions that have resulted in two ACTIVE restraining orders in la superior court and one in Santa Monica court house.
http://www.ripoffreport.com/r/Rebecca-Vasconcellos/Long-Beach-California-90807/Rebecca-Vasconcellos-Rebecca-Rosa-Vasconcellos-Nicotine-lady-Rebrosavelnet-Rebrosa-A-968644
The people Rebecca Rosa Vasconcellos, AKA Rebecca Vasconcellos AKA Ambrosia Vynne porno productions AKA Nicotine lady, AKA
[email protected], AKA
[email protected], AKA
[email protected] uses to harass, stalk, and rob bank accounts, hack into e-mails are her friends below:
1) Kathleen Frances Sanford, Oakland, CA works as John Muir hospital in walnut creek, CA
2) Christine Sanford Hanson, Walnut creek CA
3) Eric charles Hanson, Walnut creek CA
4) Harry Stuver, Carson CA
5) Luciano Leon, Los angeles, CA a photographer
6) Sandi kovach Long: https://www.linkedin.com/pub/sandi-kovach-long/9/24/723
7) Salvatore D'onfrio: http://www.healthguardians.com/sal-vatore-donofrio.php
8) Leanne Tucker
9) Steve Tucker
10) Elizabeth Vasconcellos
Stay away from this mentally ill freak and all her friends, they will pose as clients, and will come to your business and try to defraud you and ruin your life professionally. This sick woman will stalk you for years and years and years and will continue to solicit her friends and idiotic people off of the internet to help her commit illegal and criminal acts.
DO NOT HELP THIS WOMAN, IT IS ALL ILLEGAL AND WILL LAND YOU IN JAIL FOR AIDING AND ABETTING OR IN THE CIVIL COURT IN FRONT OF A JUDGE!
Aiders and abettors are not only equally responsible for the perpetrator's intended criminal activity. They are also equally responsible for any crimes that are the natural and probable consequences of that original crime.28
"Natural and probable consequences" are foreseeable consequences given all the surrounding circumstances.29 Whether a further crime is a "natural and probable consequence" of the original planned crime is a question that the jury must answer.30
Example: The defendant was in charge of driving the "get-away" car after the perpetrator robbed a jewelry store. The perpetrator entered the store wearing a ski parka with a hood and sunglasses and carrying a brown paper bag that held a pillow.
While in the store, the perpetrator shot an employee in the face, and then shot and killed the store owner. The defendant argued that he should not suffer accomplice liability for murder and attempted murder because he did not share in the perpetrator's intent to kill either victim.
The court disagreed. It reasoned that "to 'share' the perpetrator's intent does not mean that the aider and abettor is prepared to commit the offense by his own act. All that is needed is a knowing intent to assist the perpetrator's commission of the crime. Once that intent is formed, the liability of an aider and abettor 'extends also to the natural and reasonable consequences of the acts he knowingly and intentionally aids and encourages'".
When the perpetrator entered the store with a gun and a pillow to muffle the sound of possible gunfire, the shootings were indeed a natural and probable consequence of the robbery itself.31
Call us for help...
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If you or loved one is charged with aiding and abetting and you are looking to hire an attorney for representation, we invite you to contact us at Shouse Law Group. We can provide a free consultation in office or by phone. We have local offices in Los Angeles, the San Fernando Valley, Pasadena, Long Beach, Orange County, Ventura, San Bernardino, Rancho Cucamonga, Riverside, San Diego, Sacramento, Oakland, San Francisco, San Jose and throughout California.
To learn more about Nevada aiding & abetting law, go to our article on Nevada aiding & abetting law.
Legal References:
1 California Jury Instructions - Criminal "CALJIC" 3.01 -- Aiding and Abetting. ("A person aids and abets the [commission] [or] [attempted commission] of a crime when he or she: (1) With knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, and (2) With the intent or purpose of committing or encouraging or facilitating the commission of the crime, and (3) By act or advice, [or, by failing to act in a situation where a person has a legal duty to act,] aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime. [A person who aids and abets the [commission] [or] [attempted commission] of a crime need not be present at the scene of the crime.] [Mere presence at the scene of a crime which does not itself assist the commission of the crime does not amount to aiding and abetting.] [Mere knowledge that a crime is being committed and [in the absence of a legal duty to take every step reasonably possible to prevent the crime,] the failure to prevent it does not amount to aiding and abetting.]")
2 See same.
3 Our California criminal defense attorneys have local Los Angeles law offices in Beverly Hills, Burbank, Glendale, Lancaster, Long Beach, Los Angeles, Pasadena, Pomona, Torrance, Van Nuys, West Covina, and Whittier. We have additional law offices conveniently located throughout the state in Orange County, San Diego, Riverside, San Bernardino, Ventura, San Jose, Oakland, the San Francisco Bay area, and several nearby cities.
4 See CALJIC 3.01, Aiding and Abetting, endnote 1, above.
5 People v. Swanson-Birabent (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 733, 751-752. ("Contrary to defendant's assertion, advance knowledge is not a prerequisite for liability as an aider and abettor. "Aiding and abetting may be committed 'on the spur of the moment,' that is, as instantaneously as the criminal act itself. [Citation.]" ( People v. Nguyen (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 532, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 323.) In People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 282 Cal.Rptr. 450, 811 P.2d 742 ( Cooper ), the court held that "a getaway driver who has no prior knowledge of a robbery, but who forms the intent to aid in carrying away the loot during such asportation, may properly be found liable as an aider and abettor of the robbery." ( Id. at p. 1161, 282 Cal.Rptr. 450, 811 P.2d 742.) The court reasoned that "the commission of robbery continues so long as the loot is being carried away to a place of temporary safety." ( Id. at p. 1170, 282 Cal.Rptr. 450, 811 P.2d 742; see also People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1039, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 128, 874 P.2d 903 [upholding burglary conviction for aider and abettor who did not have knowledge of criminal purpose until after entry].)")
6 People v. Durham (1969) 70 Cal.2d 171, 185, fn. 11.
7 People v. Masters (1963) 219 Cal.App.2d 672, 680.
8 People v. Fraize (1995) 36 C.A.4th 1722.
9 California Penal Code 182 PC - Conspiracy. ("(a) If two or more persons conspire: (1) To commit any crime. (2) Falsely and maliciously to indict another for any crime, or to procure another to be charged or arrested for any crime. (3) Falsely to move or maintain any suit, action, or proceeding. (4) To cheat and defraud any person of any property, by any means which are in themselves criminal, or to obtain money or property by false pretenses or by false promises with fraudulent intent not to perform those promises. (5) To commit any act injurious to the public health, to public morals, or to pervert or obstruct justice, or the due administration of the laws. (6) To commit any crime against the person of the President or Vice President of the United States, the Governor of any state or territory, any United States justice or judge, or the secretary of any of the executive departments of the United States. They are punishable as follows: When they conspire to commit any crime against the person of any official specified in paragraph (6), they are guilty of a felony and are punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for five, seven, or nine years. When they conspire to commit any other felony, they shall be punishable in the same manner and to the same extent as is provided for the punishment of that felony. If the felony is one for which different punishments are prescribed for different degrees, the jury or court which finds the defendant guilty thereof shall determine the degree of the felony the defendant conspired to commit. If the degree is not so determined, the punishment for conspiracy to commit the felony shall be that prescribed for the lesser degree, except in the case of conspiracy to commit murder, in which case the punishment shall be that prescribed for murder in the first degree. If the felony is conspiracy to commit two or more felonies which have different punishments and the commission of those felonies constitute but one offense of conspiracy, the penalty shall be that prescribed for the felony which has the greater maximum term. When they conspire to do an act described in paragraph (4), they shall be punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year, or by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by both that imprisonment and fine. When they conspire to do any of the other acts described in this section, they shall be punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year, or in the state prison, or by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by both that imprisonment and fine. When they receive a felony conviction for conspiring to commit identity theft, as defined in Section 530.5, the court may impose a fine of up to twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000). All cases of conspiracy may be prosecuted and tried in the superior court of any county in which any overt act tending to effect the conspiracy shall be done. (b) Upon a trial for conspiracy, in a case where an overt act is necessary to constitute the offense, the defendant cannot be convicted unless one or more overt acts are expressly alleged in the indictment or information, nor unless one of the acts alleged is proved; but other overt acts not alleged may be given in evidence.")
See also California Penal Code 184 PC - Conspiracy; overt act. ("No agreement amounts to a conspiracy, unless some act, beside such agreement, be done within this state to effect the object thereof, by one or more of the parties to such agreement and the trial of cases of conspiracy may be had in any county in which any such act be done.")
10 California Penal Code 971 PC -- Abrogation of distinction between accessories and principals, and between principals in first and second degree; effect upon pleadings. ("The distinction between an accessory before the fact and a principal, and between principals in the first and second degree is abrogated; and all persons concerned in the commission of a crime, who by the operation of other provisions of this code are principals therein, shall hereafter be prosecuted, tried and punished as principals and no other facts need be alleged in any accusatory pleading against any such person than are required in an accusatory pleading against a principal.")
See also People v. Kennedy (1953) 116 Cal.App.2d 273, 275. ("From a reading of this section [Penal Code 971] it is manifest that the information having charged petitioner as a principal, it was open to the district attorney to prove that the former actually committed the offense or that he aided and abetted in its commission, or advised and encouraged its commission. Petitioner having been charged as a principal in the crime of kidnapping for the purpose of robbery, it was not necessary that he be charged with aiding or abetting in said kidnapping as a prerequisite to the introduction of evidence that he did so, or to warrant a decision by the trial judge, if such aiding and abetting was proved beyond a reasonable doubt, that petitioner was guilty as a principal in the commission of the offense.")
11 People v. Singleton (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 488, 492.
12 See CALJIC 3.01 -- Aiding and Abetting, endnote 1, above. ("[A person who aids and abets the [commission] [or] [attempted commission] of a crime need not be present at the scene of the crime.]")
See also People v. Bohmer (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 185, 199. ("The criminal complicity of the man who lights the fuse does not disappear because he is at a distance when the bomb explodes. Penal Code section 31 in relevant part provides: "All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether it be felony or misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, or, not being present, have advised and encouraged its commission ... are principals in any crime so committed." It is not necessary that one be physically present when a crime is committed to abet or encourage its commission.")
13 People v. Booth (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1256. ("While accomplice liability cannot be predicated on conduct absent the required mental state, one can be guilty as an accomplice (if he shares the goal of the perpetrator) without having actually assisted the commission of the offense, e.g., by "instigating," or "advising" the perpetrator to commit it or by having been "present for the purpose of its commission." (See Campbell, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 411, and cases cited.)")
14 People v. Villa (1957) 156 Cal. App. 2d 128, 133.
15 People v. Booth, endnote 13, above.
16 See CALJIC 3.01 -- Aiding and Abetting, endnote 1, above. ("[Mere knowledge that a crime is being committed and [in the absence of a legal duty to take every step reasonably possible to prevent the crime,] the failure to prevent it does not amount to aiding and abetting.]")
17 Penal Code 272 PC California's contributing to the delinquency of a minor law, section (a)(2).
18 People v. Swanson-Birabent, endnote 5, above.
19 Riverside criminal defense attorney Michael Scafiddi uses his former experience as an Ontario Police Officer to represent clients throughout the Inland Empire including San Bernardino, Riverside, Rancho Cucamonga, Hemet, Banning, Fontana, Joshua Tree, Barstow, Palm Springs and Victorville.
20 CALJIC 3.03 -- Termination of Liability of Aider and Abettor. ("Before the commission of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] , an aider and abettor may withdraw from participation in [that] [those] crime[s], and thus avoid responsibility for [that] [those] crime[s] by doing two things: First, [he] [she] must notify the other principals known to [him] [her] of [his] [her] intention to withdraw from the commission of [that] [those] crime[s]; second, [he] [she] must do everything in [his] [her] power to prevent its commission. The People have the burden of proving that the defendant was a principal in and had not effectively withdrawn from participation in [that] [those] crime[s]. If you have a reasonable doubt that [he] [she] was a principal in and participated as an aider and abettor in a crime charged, you must find [him] [her] not guilty of that crime[.] [, and any crime committed by a co-principal that was a natural and probable consequence of the same crime.]")
21 In re Michael T. (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 907, 911. ("Mere presence at the scene of a crime which does not itself assist its commission or mere knowledge that a crime is being committed and the failure to prevent it does not amount to aiding and abetting.")
22 People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1039, footnote 7. ("[I]n accord[ ] with the clear trend, the accessory after the fact is no longer treated as a party to the underlying felony, as at common law. This kind of accessory is coming to be recognized for what he is: an 'obstructer' of justice, the author of a separate and independent offense."")
23 California Penal Code 32 - Accessories, punishment. ("Except in cases where a different punishment is prescribed, an accessory is punishable by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by imprisonment in the state prison, or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.")
24 California Penal Code 31 - Principals, defined. ("All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether it be felony or misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, or, not being present, have advised and encouraged its commission, and all persons counseling, advising, or encouraging children under the age of fourteen years, or persons who are mentally incapacitated, to commit any crime, or who, by fraud, contrivance, or force, occasion the drunkenness of another for the purpose of causing him to commit any crime, or who, by threats, menaces, command, or coercion, compel another to commit any crime, are principals in any crime so committed.")
See also People v. Green (1950) 96 Cal.App.2d 283, 290. (""Where persons are not actors in the actual commission of the crime charged, but aid and abet others in its commission or procure others to commit the crime, all are equally guilty."")
25 CALJIC 3.00 Principals-Defined. ("Persons who are involved in [committing] [or] [attempting to commit] a crime are referred to as principals in that crime. Each principal, regardless of the extent or manner of participation is [equally guilty.] [guilty of a crime.] Principals include: 1 Those who directly and actively [commit] [or] [attempt to commit] the act constituting the crime, or 2 Those who aid and abet the [commission] [or] [attempted commission] of the crime. [When the crime charged is [either] [murder] [or] [attempted murder] [ ], the aider and abettor's guilt is determined by the combined acts of all the participants as well as that persons own mental state. If the aider and abettor's mental state is more culpable than that of the actual perpetrator, that person's guilt may be greater than that of the actual perpetrator. Similarly, the aider and abettor's guilt may be less than the perpetrator's, if the aider and abettor has a less culpable mental state.]")
26 People v. Mccoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1122. ("We thus conclude that when a person, with the mental state necessary for an aider and abettor, helps or induces another to kill, that person's guilt is determined by the combined acts of all the participants as well as that person's own mens rea. If that person's mens rea is more culpable than another's, that person's guilt may be greater even if the other might be deemed the actual perpetrator.FN3 Because we cannot anticipate all possible nonhomicide crimes or circumstances, we express no view on whether or how these principles apply outside the homicide context. (See Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law, supra, § 30.06[C], pp. 450-451.)")
27 Facts taken from same.
28 People v. Coffman (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 106-107. ("Elaborating on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, in People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 261, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013, and People v. Croy (1985) 41 Cal.3d 1, 12, footnote 5, 221 Cal.Rptr. 592, 710 P.2d 392, we observed that an aider and abettor "is guilty not only of the offense he intended to facilitate or encourage, but also of any reasonably foreseeable offense committed by the person he aids and abets." As the Court of Appeal in People v. Brigham (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1039, 265 Cal.Rptr. 486 noted, although variations in phrasing are found in decisions addressing the doctrine-"probable and natural," "natural and reasonable," and "reasonably foreseeable"-the ultimate factual question is one of foreseeability. ( Id. at pp. 1050, 1054, 265 Cal.Rptr. 486; see People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 316-322, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276, 826 P.2d 274.) "A natural and probable consequence is a foreseeable consequence..."")
See also CALJIC 3.02 Principals-Liability for Natural and Probable Consequences. ("One who aids and abets [another] in the commission of a crime [or crimes] is not only guilty of [that crime] [those crimes], but is also guilty of any other crime committed by a principal which is a natural and probable consequence of the crime[s] originally aided and abetted. In order to find the defendant guilty of the crimes[s] of , [under this theory,] [as charged in Count[s] ,] you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that: 1 The crime [or crimes] of [was] [were] committed; 2 That the defendant aided and abetted [that] [those] crime[s]; 3 That a co-principal in that crime committed the crime[s] of ; and 4 The crime[s] of [was] [were] a natural and probable consequence of the commission of the crime[s] of. [In determining whether a consequence is "natural and probable," you must apply an objective test, based not on what the defendant actually intended, but on what a person of reasonable and ordinary prudence would have expected likely to occur. The issue is to be decided in light of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident. A "natural" consequence is one which is within the normal range of outcomes that may be reasonably expected to occur if nothing unusual has intervened. "Probable" means likely to happen.] [You are not required to unanimously agree as to which originally contemplated crime the defendant aided and abetted, so long as you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimously agree that the defendant aided and abetted the commission of an identified and defined target crime and that the crime of __________ was a natural and probable consequence of the commission of that target crime.]")
29 See both cites, endnote 28, above.
30 People v. Godinez (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 492, 499. ("The parties agree the liability of an aider and abettor is not limited to the target crime which he knowingly and intentionally aids and encourages, but can include crimes committed by the perpetrator which are natural and reasonable consequences of the criminal course of conduct the aider and abettor knowingly aids and encourages. ( People v. Jones (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1090, 1095-1096 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 464].) It is now settled that it is a question of fact whether the charged offense was a natural and reasonable consequence of the target offense knowingly encouraged, and the jury should be instructed of its responsibility to determine this factual issue.")